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Abstract
Risk theory tells us if an insurer can eﬀectively pool a large number of individuals to reduce
the total risk, he then can provide the insurance by charging a premium close to the actu-
arially fair rate. There is, however, a common belief that the risk can be eﬀectively pooled
only when the random loss is independent, so that crop insurance markets cannot survive
without government subsidy because crop yields are not independent among growers. In this
paper, we take a a spatial statistics approach to examine the eﬀectiveness of risk pooling for
crop insurance under correlation. We develop a method for evaluating the eﬀectiveness of
risk pooling under correlation and apply the method to three major crops in the US: wheat,
soybeans and corn. The empirical study shows that yields for the three crops present zero
or negative correlation when two counties are far apart, which complies with a weaker con-
dition than independence, ﬁnite-range positive dependency. The results show that eﬀective
risk pooling is possible and reveal a high possibility of a private crop insurance market in
the US.
Crop insurance has been an important instrument for protecting farmers’ income against
low yield resulting from adverse weather and other natural disasters. Except for a few perils
such as hail and ﬁre, the multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) has only been oﬀered by the
US government with a huge subsidy. MPCI was ﬁrst introduced in 1938 on a trial basis,
and extended in 1980 to most crops in the US. MPCI pays an indemnity to a farmer based
on the diﬀerence between a pre-selected coverage yield level and the farmer’s realized yield
1level. For years, billions of dollars of ﬁnancial deﬁcits have been accumulated by the gov-
ernment to provide MPCI, and farmers’ participation rate is still low. These problems have
been attributed to moral hazard, adverse selection, and high administrative costs (Knight
and Coble,1997; Skees, Black and Barnett,1997; Goodwin and Smith,1995). To deal with
these problems, a Group Risk Plan (GRP) was introduced in 1994, which pays a farmer
an indemnity only when the realized average yield of his county falls below the pre-selected
coverage level. Evaluation of county yields instead of individual farm yields for indemniﬁ-
cation greatly reduces the insurer’s administrative costs. The disadvantage of GRP is that
it does not protect farmers as eﬀectively as MPCI when the farm yield and county yield
are not highly correlated. In the late 1990s, revenue insurance programs were piloted that
could protect farmers from both price and yield risks including those that were based on
farm yields such as Income Protection, Crop Revenue Coverage and Revenue Assurance and
those based on county average yields such as Group Revenue Insurance Programs.
To cope with the actuarial problems with federal crop insurance programs, three lines
of study in the area of agricultural risk protection are currently advanced by economists.
The ﬁrst line is to investigate the theory of area-based insurance and the risk protection
eﬀectiveness of GRP (Miranda, 1991; Wang et al, 1998). The second line is to study revenue
insurance which takes the advantage of usually negatively correlated price and yield risks
and focuses on stabilizing the overall income (Hennessy, 1997; Skees et al, 1998). The third
line is to study market instruments that are based on natural conditions, such as weather
derivatives, which also deal with the moral hazard problem (Turvey,1999). The ﬁrst two
lines are focused on the current government programs, and the last line also fails to address
the question of whether it is feasible for private insurers to provide agricultural insurance.
Although positive correlation among farm yields is the basis for GRP and weather deriva-
tives, it is perhaps the major factor that has discouraged the consideration of private crop
insurance. It is a common belief that eﬀective risk pooling is built upon the independence
2between risk exposure units, and that a private market for crop insurance is doomed to fail
because of the systemic risk existing in crop yield (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). However,
this belief has not been thoroughly studied. Therefore, it is important to investigate carefully
whether private agricultural insurance and reinsurance markets can exist without or with a
minimum government subsidy, what conditions are required, and whether these conditions
are present in the current situation. The objectives of this research are (1) to explore neces-
sary statistical conditions for eﬀective risk pooling; (2) to investigate the pattern of US crop
yields’ correlation; and (3) to develop a method to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of risk pooling
under correlation and apply it to the US crops. Each of the objectives is pursued in one of
the following three sections, and the last section consists of a summary and discussion.
Statistical Foundations of Insurance
The primary function of insurance is risk pooling. Mehr, Cammack and Rose (1985) oﬀer
the following deﬁnition, “Insurance may be deﬁned as a device for reducing risk by combining
a suﬃcient number of exposure units to make their individual losses collectively predictable.”
In the insurance literature, the occurrence of an aggregate loss that is so large as to deplete
the insurance fund is captured by the concept of ruin. It has been suggested that a possible
objective criterion for the management of an insurance pool is to minimize the probability of
ruin in a given time period or perhaps maximize returns subject to maintaining a speciﬁed
probability of ruin (B¨ uhlmann, 1970). These are the Safety-First criteria developed by Roy
(1952) and Telser (1956). The aggregated premium surplus above the expected value of the
aggregate loss required to maintain a particular probability of ruin is referred to as the buﬀer
fund. In what follows, we will consider the statistical foundations of insurance based upon
the framework provided by Cummins (1991), while incorporating the spatial characteristics
of crop insurance.
Review of some basic concepts in premium rates is now in order. Premium rate setting
generally begins with the concept of pure or net premiums (Hogg and Klugman, 1984; Borch,
31974; Goodwin and Smith,1995). The net premium is simply the expected indemnity per
exposure unit. The gross premium, the amount paid by the insured per exposure unit in
order to be eligible for coverage, is larger than the net premium by an amount referred to
as the premium loading factor. We can examine the components of the gross premium by
decomposing the gross premium into three parts, P = PN + A + L, where P is the gross
premium, PN is the net premium, A is the administrative cost load, L is the buﬀer load, and
A + L is the premium loading factor.
Let Y (s;t) be the yield at the t-th year of the exposure unit with a two-dimensional spatial
index s representing its location, and c(s;t) be the pre-speciﬁed coverage level. The exposure
unit will experience a production loss in the amount of X(s;t) = maxf0;c(s;t)  Y (s;t)g,
and this amount is also the indemnity payment for this unit at year t if we assume that price
is normalized to be unitary. Once a model on the yield Y (s;t) is built, the distribution of
Y (s;t) is then speciﬁed, from which we can obtain the distribution of X(s;t) and hence the
mean loss E(X(s;t)) for any given prespeciﬁed value c(s;t). The total loss of N exposure





where i denotes the i-th exposure unit, and si is the spatial location of the ith unit. In the
model given by equation (1), each individual loss is conceptualized as a random variable and
the total loss experienced by the pool is random as well. The expected total loss of the pool
at year t is: E(SN(t)) =
PN
i=1 E(X(si;t)). We need to obtain the variance of the total loss
in order to know how much the actual total loss, SN(t), can diﬀer from the expected total















 N(0; 1): (3)
See, for example, Bolthausen (1982) for stationary random ﬁelds and Guyon (1995, Theorem
3.3.1, page 112) for non-stationary random ﬁelds. Therefore,
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In this case the buﬀer fund needs to be E(SN(t)) + 2
q
V ar(SN(t)) in order to maintain a
0.025 probability of ruin for year t.
As mentioned previously, E(SN(t)) can be computed once the yield Y (s;t) is modeled and
all prespeciﬁed levels are known. E(SN(t)) can also be calculated if the prespeciﬁed levels are
unknown but have some known probability distribution. Calculation of V ar(SN(t)) is more
cumbersome unless individual losses are independent. In addition, the losses are truncated
and spatially dependent random variables. Even though some methods in spatial statistics
may seem appropriate and applicable here, it is diﬃcult to directly apply the methods
because the losses are generally non-stationary unless we put some unrealistic assumptions
of the prespeciﬁed levels c(s;t). In this paper, we will propose an approach to overcome the
diﬃculty.
In order to gain some insight to the risk pooling theory, let us ﬁrst consider the simplest
case when the losses are independently and identically distributed.
An Example—The i.i.d. Case
Even though the assumption of i.i.d. losses is unnecessarily strong and generally not
realistic (B¨ uhlmann, 1970), results are much simpliﬁed under these assumptions and can
help us see some key issues in risk pooling. When the losses are i.i.d,
E(SN(t)) = N; V ar(SN(t)) = N
2; (5)
where  and 2 are the mean and variance of loss from each exposure unit, respectively.
The central limit theorem implies that, when N is large, SN(t) is approximately normally
5distributed and thus, for any 0 <  < 1,
P(jSN(t)  Nj < z=2
p
N)  1  ;
where z=2 is the positive value which the standard normal random variable exceeds with a
probability =2. For  = 0:05, the corresponding value of z=2 is 1.96. Hence, to maintain
a probability of ruin no more than 0.025, the liquid buﬀer fund needs to be approximately
1:96
p
N for N individuals. The buﬀer load L for each individual unit is 1:96=
p
N, which
decreases as the number of exposure units N increases.
If we assume economies of scale in the administration function, then the administrative
cost per exposure unit, A, will decline as the size of the insurance pool grows. Thus, for a
suﬃciently large insurance pool, the premium loading A + L will not be large, i.e., the risk
premium a risk averse insured must pay to obtain coverage will be small.
From this example we see that a critical ingredient for risk pooling is that the standard
deviation of the average loss, i.e., =
p
N in the i.i.d. case, diminishes as the size of the
insurance pool increases. Under this condition, the buﬀer load also declines as the pool
grows larger, thus ensuring (assuming economies of scale in administration) that the premium
loading is relatively small. As we will see in the sequel, these properties may be retained
when losses are not independent.
Finite-Range Positive Dependency of Spatial Variables
In what follows we will explicitly relax the assumption of independence. Many statistical
results that hold under the i.i.d assumption can be generalized into the dependence case.
For example, under some mixing and regularity conditions, the central limit theorem (3)
holds for the spatial process X(s;t) (See, e.g., Theorem 3.3.1, page 112 of Guyon, 1995):
where the mixing conditions ensure that the dependency dies oﬀ suﬃciently quickly as the
lag distance increases for spatial process X(s;t).
In the context of crop insurance, although an established insurance company can use
reserve funds from the earlier years’ premium surplus to pay for a particular year’s indemnity,
6the discussion of eﬀective risk pooling is still focused on the loss in any particular year.
Therefore, it is particularly useful to investigate how yields or yield losses are spatially
correlated for a given year. For example, how likely is it that the majority of the insured
experience a loss in a particular year, in which case the insurer might be jeopardized? It seems
that the spatial statistics approach has not been employed in the study of crop insurance,
although spatial statistics has been successfully used in agriculture for other purposes (e.g.,
see Mercer and Hall 1911; Besag and Higdon, 1999, both for uniformity trials; Roberts,
English, and Mahajanashetti, 2000 for precision agriculture; Zhang, 2001 for an application
in plant pathology.)
Let us ﬁrst review some terminologies and theories in spatial statistics. We refer readers
to Cressie (1993, Chapter 2) for more details on spatial statistics. A spatial process, X(s),
is said to be second-order stationary if the mean is a constant and for any vectors s;h,
Cov(X(s);X(s + h)) = C(h);
where C() is called the covariogram; and h is called the lag. Therefore, the covariogram
measures the correlation structure of the spatial process. Here X(s) refers to a general
spatial process and should not be confused with X(s;t) , the yield loss. Using data X(si);i =
1;;N, the covariogram can be estimated by:
ˆ C(h) = (1=jN(h)j)
X
(i;j)2N(h)
(X(si)  ˆ i)(X(sj)  ˆ j) (6)
where N(h) is a set containing all pairs (i;j) such that h = sj  si for a particular level of
h; jN(h)j is the number of pairs in the set N(h); and ˆ i and ˆ j are the estimated means of
X(si) and X(sj) respectively.
X(s) is said to be isotropic if its covariogram C(h) depends on distance jjhjj only but
not on the direction, i.e., the covariogram is non-directional. The covariogram is then a
function of distance h and, following a conventional notation, we use C(h);h > 0 to denote
7the isotropic covariogram. Then C(h) can be estimated by
ˆ C(h) = (1=jN(h)j)
X
(i;j)2N(h)
(X(si)  ˆ i)(X(sj)  ˆ j) (7)
where N(h) is the set of all pairs (si;sj) such that the distance jjsi  sjjj is h, jN(h)j is
the number of elements in N(h). In reality, it is possible that X(si)s have diﬀerent means
but still possess a stationary covariogram. In this case, we will ﬁrst remove the mean and
then estimate the covariogram. Note that in practice, only a few pairs are exactly the same
distance apart, N(h) is therefore a set that contains all pairs (si;sj) so that the distance
jjsi  sjjj is approximately h. We refer to Journel and Huijbregts (1978, p.194) and Cressie
(1993, p. 70) for recommendation of the “tolerance” region.
Another measure of correlation for a spatial process is the correlogram that is deﬁned as




where 2 is the common variance of each X(si). In almost all interesting situations, the
correlation between any two points becomes weaker when the lag distance increases. A
process is said to be ﬁnite-range dependent, or m-dependent (Davis and Borgman, 1982) if
any two points, X(si) and X(sj) are independent when the lag distance jjsi  sjjj > m for
some real positive number m. The ﬁnite-range dependence implies the mixing conditions
that ensure the central limit theorem in (3).
Here, we deﬁne a spatial process, X(s), to be ﬁnite-range positive dependent (f.r.p.d.) if
the correlation between any two points, X(si) and X(sj) is positive when the lag distance
jjsisjjj < d for some d, and zero or negative otherwise. This f.r.p.d. assumption seems quite
sensible in light of the fact that the correlation between the yield losses of two ﬁelds caused
by adverse weather will eventually vanish when the two ﬁelds are very far away from each
other. We can give suﬃcient conditions under which the central limit theorem (3) holds for
f.r.p.d. processes. These conditions must ensure that dependency quickly dies oﬀ (so does
8the correlation) when the lag distance increases. Discussion of these conditions is beyond
the scope of this paper. Note in the deﬁnition of f.r.p.d, the spatial process needs not to be
stationary.
For any location si, denote by Oi the set of all locations whose distances from si are at
most d, i.e., Oi = fsj : 0  jjsj  sijj  dg: If the process X(s) is f.r.p.d. and the variance of
X(s) is bounded by some constant 2
m, we can place the following bound on the variance














































where jOij denotes the number of elements in Oi. Inequality (10) holds because each cor-
relation coeﬃcient is no greater than one, the sum over j is no larger than the number of
elements in set Oi under f.r.p.d., and the inequality (11) holds because each set cardinality
jOij is no larger than the largest set size.
If the spatial process X(s) is f.r.p.d. with a ﬁnite-range d, then for any site si the
corresponding set Oi has at most a ﬁnite number of elements. Indeed, if the exposure units
(counties, farms or plots) have a minimum area, a, then maxi(jOij)  d2=a, i.e., bounded by
a constant that depends on d but not on N or i. We then have, in view of (10), V ar( ¯ XN) ! 0,
as N goes to inﬁnity, i.e., the variance of ¯ XN diminishes as N gets larger. If X(s) represents
the yield loss, this diminishment would mean that the buﬀer load per unit is very small for
large N. Therefore, if a reasonably large number of units from a geographically large area
participate in the insurance program, the premium charged to each participant can be very
close to the actuarially fair level. As long as the farmer is risk averse, s/he should be willing
to pay for such insurance.
9We have just shown that V ar( ¯ XN) vanishes as N ! 1 for a f.r.p.d. process. This is
an asymptotic result that assures us that V ar( ¯ XN) can be arbitrarily small if the sample
size is suﬃciently large. In reality, only limited number of sample data are available. For a
particular sample size, we may be able to evaluate V ar( ¯ XN) by directly applying (9) to get
a better bound than (11).
If X(s) represents the yield loss, the eﬀectiveness of risk pooling depends much on how fast
the variance of average loss diminishes. Several factors may aﬀect this speed of diminishment:
how fast the correlation of yields dies oﬀ when the lag distance increases, the speciﬁed
coverage levels and range of dependence. Using some spatial statistics technique, we will
show next how to calculate the variance of the average loss, as illustrated by the US crop
yield data.
The Pattern of US Crop Yield Dependence
Because crop yields are correlated due to weather patterns, it is believed that private
insurance companies can not eﬀectively pool the risks without signiﬁcant subsidies from the
government. We intend to show here that such belief is not well grounded. We will explore
the spatial dependence pattern of US crop yields for a given year to ﬁnd out if the correlation
between exposure units quickly dies oﬀ as two units become far apart, leaving enough room
for risk pooling.
Data and detrending
County level crop yields from 1972 to 1997 provided by National Agricultural Statistics
Service, United States Department of Agriculture, are used in this analysis. This is because
farm level yield data are not available. Three major crops, corn, soybeans, and wheat are
studied. There are 2,591 counties for corn, 2,000 counties for soybeans, and 2,641 counties
for wheat in the data set (counties with less than ﬁve years of observations are dropped).
The centroid latitude and longitude of each county are obtained from Bureau of the Census,
United States Department of Commerce. These spherical references are then transformed
10into plane coordinates using ArcInfo, so that they can be applied in the statistical software
S-Plus (Mathsoft, Inc., Seattle) which has a spatial module. The temporal trend is removed
ﬁrst by location. For each location, yields are detrended by a log quadratic trend. Log
quadratic trends are generally used for crop yields (Miranda and Glauber, 1997; Wang et
al., 1998). Let (s;t) be the detrended yield, where s is the county centroid and t is the
year. That is, (s;t) is the deviation of the yield from its mean yield at year t. The yield is
modeled as,
Y (s;t) = expf(s) + (s)t + (s)t
2g + (s;t);
where ;  and  are location-speciﬁc parameters; and the mean of yield is m(s;t) =
E(Y (s;t)) = exp((s) + (s)t + (s)t2), which is a log quadratic trend in the sense that
ln(m(s;t)) is quadratic in time. The trend model is ﬁtted for each location. It is very
important for crop insurance to see how these (s;t)’s are correlated for a given year. We




Based on the detrended yields, (s;t), we calculated the covariogram and correlogram for
each crop at each year from 1972 to 1997 using equations (6) and (8). Diﬀerent directions
are calculated and the results suggest it is reasonable to assume isotropy. Hence, reported








((si;t)  ¯ t)((sj;t)  ¯ t); h > 0;
where N(h) is the set of all pairs (si;sj) such that the distance jjsi  sjjj is h, jN(h)j is
the number of elements in N(h), ¯ t is the sample mean of (si; t) for year t, and ˆ 2
t is the
estimated variance of (s;t) for year t.
There are altogether 78 correlograms for the three crops and 26 years. For each crop,
the correlograms of the 26 years show a consistent pattern. From these correlograms we
11see that the positive dependency quickly dies oﬀ when the distance increases, i.e., the crop
yields show a clear pattern of f.r.p.d. The distance for the positive dependency is at most
3106 feet, or 570 miles, and in many instances, the range is much smaller than 570 miles.
We only present the correlograms for year 1981, year 1991, and the average of 26 years for
each of the three crops in Figure 1. Do the correlations die oﬀ suﬃciently quickly to allow
for eﬀective risking pooling? We will propose a measure of eﬀectiveness of risk pooling next.
The Eﬀectiveness of Risk Pooling
In this section, we introduce a measure of eﬀectiveness for risk pooling, and then calculate
the premium loading factor for each of the three US crops: wheat, soybeans and corn.
A measure of risk pooling eﬀectiveness
As we pointed out before, a critical ingredient for risk pooling is that the sample variance
decreases as N increases. One way to measure the eﬀectiveness of risk pooling is to see how
small the variance of ¯ Xt is compared with the the average variance of each individual X(s;t),
i.e., V ar( ¯ Xt)=(
PN
i=1 V ar(X(si; t))=N): The ratio, denoted by t for year t, will be called the
coeﬃcient of eﬀectiveness and can be expressed in terms of the covariances or correlations:
t =
V ar( ¯ Xt)
PN















Cov(X(si; t); X(sj; t))
1
A:
Clearly, if the losses are independent, then t = 1=N. When the losses are positively cor-











Corr(X(si; t); X(sj; t))
1
A: (12)
The correlation coeﬃcient Corr(X(si; t); X(sj; t)) obviously depends on the prespeciﬁed
levels as well as the joint distribution of yields Y (si; t) and Y (sj; t). So far we have made
no distributional assumptions on yields Y (s; t) other than stationarity. To get a feeling of
how the losses X(s; t) = max(0; c(s; t)  Y (s; t)) are correlated, let us now assume yields
12Y (s; t) are normal and that each of the prespeciﬁed levels c(s; t) is one standard deviation
below the the mean of Y (s; t), i.e., c(s; t) = (s; t)  (s; t). Then
X(s; t) = c(s; t)  (s;t)  (s; t)min
 
c(s; t)  (s; t)
(s; t)
;
Y (s; t)  (s; t)
(s; t)
!
= c(s; t)  (s;t)  (s; t)min(1; Z(s;t))
where Z(s; t) = (Y (s; t)  (s; t))=(s; t) is a standard normal random variable. Hence,
the correlation between the truncated losses can be expressed as the correlation between trun-
cated standard normal random variables, i.e., Corr(X(si; t); X(sj; t)) = Corr(min(1; Z(si; t));
min(1; Z(sj;t)). This correlation is clearly a function of
Corr(Z(si; t); Z(sj; t)) = Corr(Y (si;t); Y (sj; t)) = t(jjsi  sjjj):
Let us write g(c1; c2; ) = Corr(min(c1; Z1); min(c2; Z2)) for two standard normal vari-
ables Z1 and Z2 that are also bivariate-normal with a correlation coeﬃcient . Then
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The integrals cannot be evaluated in closed form, but can be approximated by the Monte
Carlo methods. We provide in Table 1 the correlation coeﬃcients between the truncated
normals corresponding to diﬀerent s where the standard normal variables are truncated at
-0.75, -1 and -1.5. Our results were based on 500,000 simulations. We see that the truncated
variables are signiﬁcantly less correlated.
Intuitively, the truncated variables should be less correlated. Above the truncating values,
the two truncated variables are constants and hence uncorrelated. Indeed, if the truncated
values are far below the mean, the two truncated variables are constants with a probability
close to one and hence are nearly uncorrelated. Note Table 1 was obtained for two standard
13normals. If the two variables are not normal, we might expect the truncated variables are still
less correlated. But the exact correlation coeﬃcient of the truncated variables will depend
the joint distribution of the two untruncated variables.
Recently, the Risk Management Agency of USDA allows farmers in the MPCI program
to specify a coverage level c(s; t) up to 75% of the mean yield (s; t), which is more than one
standard deviation below the mean because the coeﬃcient of variation for crops is usually less
than 1/4. Although farmers can select their own coverage levels, let us assume nonetheless
that all farmers select their coverage levels to be one standard deviation below the expected
yields, i.e., c(s; t) = (s; t)  (s; t), and see how eﬀective the risk pooling is. In this case,
the losses have the same variance and (12) is applicable. If some farmers select coverage
levels that are more than one standard deviations below the means, the losses only become
less correlated according to what we found out from Table 1. We will continue to assume
yields are normal. Since
Corr(X(si; t); X(sj; t))
= Corr(minc(1;Z(si; t)); min(1;Z(sj; t)))











g(1; 1; t(jjsi  sjjj))
1
A (14)
where t() is the covariogram of Y (s; t) and can be estimated from the data. Replacing
(jjsi  sjjj) by the estimated covariogram ˆ (jjsi  sjjj), we get an estimate for t.
Using the average correlogram of 26 years, we calculated the coeﬃcient of eﬀectiveness
 for US wheat, soybeans and corn by applying (14) with t being replaced by the average
correlogram. The coeﬃcients of eﬀectiveness are 0.00188, 0.00479 and 0.00320 for US wheat,
soybeans and corn respectively. For each crop, we used all of the counties in our database.
Hence N = 2;641;2;000 and 2,591 for wheat, soybeans and corn. These coeﬃcients mean, if
14an insurer can pool all the growing areas in the US and each unit speciﬁes the coverage level
to be one standard deviation below its mean yield, over the 26 years the variance of average
loss is only 0.188%, 0.479% and 0.32% of the variance of each individual loss. Or equivalently,
to make the risk pooling for the correlated losses to be as eﬀective as independent losses, the
number of correlated units should be approximately 4.97 times, 9.58 times and 8.3 times as
large as the number of uncorrelated units for wheat, soybeans and corn respectively, when
all units select coverage levels to be one standard deviation below the mean yields. Choosing
the coverage level to be one standard deviation below the mean would mean to insur against
adverse events that occur about 15.9% of the time. If the units select lower coverage level,
the losses will be less correlated and these factors will become smaller. These results show
that, if a large number of counties buy the insurance, eﬀective risk pooling is highly possible
at least in the case that yields are normal. Moderate departure from normal distributions
should not change the coeﬃcients of eﬀectiveness very much.
Premium loading
Due to the weak correlation between the losses, the central limit theorem can be applied.
Therefore, if the insurer’s probability of ruin is set at , the premium loading for each




i=1 V ar(X(si; t))=N)1=2, assuming the
administrative cost load is zero. The variance of a loss is bounded by the variance of yield
regardless of the distribution of yield, as shown in the Appendix. Hence Lt  zt
p
t.
The 26-year average variance, ˆ 2, is estimated from the previous section as 52, 20, and
160 for wheat, soybeans and corn, respectively. Using z0:025 = 1:96 and the s calculated in
the previous subsection, we obtain the premium loading factor to be at most 0.6128, 0.6066
and 1.4024 bushels per acre for the three crops, respectively. In terms of dollars, if the prices
are $3.5, $4.5 and $3 per bushel for wheat, soybeans and corn respectively, the corresponding
premium loadings are $2.14, $2.72 and $4.20 per acre, which are quite moderate.
Summary and Discussion
15In this paper, we have reviewed the statistical foundations for crop insurance under
dependence, and have taken a close look at the correlation structure between crop yields
at the county level in the U.S. Using some techniques in spatial statistics, we have shown
that the positive correlation between any two counties dies oﬀ quickly when the lag distance
increases, a phenomenon of ﬁnite-range positive dependence. The yield losses, as truncated
variables, are also f.r.p.d. and the correlation of losses dies oﬀ much faster. We provided
a general method for investigating the eﬀectiveness of risk pooling under dependence. Our
method employs spatial statistics and is appropriate for crop insurance. The results indicate
that risk pooling can be eﬀective for the three crops (wheat, corn and soybeans) if the
coverage levels are at least one standard deviation below the mean yields, hence suggest a
high possibility of a viable private agricultural insurance market, if the insurance/reinsurance
markets can cover most growing area in the US. These results may help alleviate the pressure
on government to assume total responsibility of providing crop insurance.
Although in this work we have applied this method to county level yields, it is also
applicable to individual farms if the farms’ geographical locations and yields are known. With
the availability of Global Position System, farm locations can be obtained easily. Insurance
agencies should also have historical farm level yield records cumulated from farmers’ years
of enrollment in MPCI, and these farm yield data can be analyzed in the same way as the
county yields. With the absence of individual farm data, it is impossible to examine the
eﬀectiveness of crop insurance at the individual farm level. However, we can show that if
growers are scattered nearly uniformly in all the counties, the correlogram of individual farm
yields is less than the correlogram of county average yields and hence dies oﬀ faster. How
are the two coeﬃcients of eﬀectiveness, one based on individual farm data and the other
on county data, compared with each other can only be examined under more assumptions,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
There are several open problems along this line for future research, one of which is the
16temporal eﬀect on risk pooling. The weather pattern is generally assumed to be independent
and so are the yields of a farm over time. Pooling risks over time may further reduce the
premium loading.
Note the buﬀer fund given as E(SN(t)) + 2(V ar(SN(t))1=2 is the upper bound. When
the yield loss is ﬁnite-range dependent (or ﬁnite-range positive dependent with additional
conditions to ensure mixing conditions), the actual total loss SN(t) is asymptotically normal.
This implies that when N is suﬃciently large, SN(t) will be symmetric. Hence SN(t) has
approximately a 50% chance to be below its mean E(SN(t)). In the case that the actual
total loss is below its mean, there will be a surplus in the buﬀer fund. Accumulation of
such surpluses will reduce the risk of pooling, and its eﬀect on risk pooling warrants further
studies. There are other avenues that private insurers can do to reduce the pooled risk. For
example, trading in international reinsurance market and diversiﬁcation over crops may help
risk pooling.
Due to the spatial dependence, more exposure units/farms are needed to equate pooling
of dependent risks to independent risks. There might be a deterrent eﬀect of the larger pool
size on a private crop insurer seeking to enter the private crop insurance market. A study
on the proﬁtability of a private crop insurance will help ﬁnd out how strong the deterrent
eﬀect may be.
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Figure 1: Correlograms of yields of wheat (top row), soybeans (middle row) and corn (bottom
row); for 1981 (left), 1991 (middle) and the average of 26 years from 1972 to 1997.
 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
c1 = c2 = 0:75 -0.077 -0.04 0.053 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.45 0.56 0.68 0.83
c1 = c2 = 1 -0.059 -0.032 0.04 0.091 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.4 0.52 0.66 0.81
c1 = c2 = 1:5 -0.027 -0.017 0.022 0.058 0.1 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.58 0.77
Table 1: The correlation coeﬃcient of truncated standard normal random variables:
g(c1;c2;) deﬁned by (13)
21Appendix
Here we show the following theorem that implies that variance of loss is bounded by the
variance of the yield.
Theorem 1 Let Y be any random variable with mean  and variance 2, and X = max(0; c
Y ) for some constant c < . Then V ar(X)  2.
Proof. First note that





















where d = (c  )= < 0 and Z = (Y  )=. Then V ar(Z) = 1, and if fZ(z) denotes the
density function of Z,
V ar(min(d; Z)) = V ar(min(d; Z)  d)














2fZ(z)dz = V ar(Z) = 1:
The proof is ﬁnished.
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